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Abstract: 
 
Little is known about the American public's policy preferences at the level of 
Congressional districts, state legislative districts, and local municipalities. In this paper, 
we overcome the limited sample sizes that have hindered previous research by jointly 
scaling the policy preferences of 275,000 Americans based on their responses to policy 
questions. We combine this large dataset of Americans’ policy preferences with recent 
advances in opinion estimation to estimate the preferences of every state, congressional 
district, state legislative district, and large city. We show that our estimates outperform 
previous measures of citizens’ policy preferences. These new estimates enable scholars to 
examine representation at a variety of geographic levels. We demonstrate the utility of 
these estimates through applications of our measures to examine representation in state 
legislatures and city governments.  
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A well-functioning democracy requires legislators to represent the will of their 
constituents. Despite this fact, political scientists still have only a limited understanding 
of the extent of constituency influence in Congress (Clinton 2006). Moreover, we know 
even less about the extent of constituency influence at other levels of government in the 
United States. Previous empirical work has been hindered by the fact that the sample size 
in national surveys is generally too small to make inferences about the preferences of 
individual geographic units. Even the largest national surveys have only about one 
hundred people in each congressional district. Making inferences below the congressional 
district level is usually even more difficult. Most surveys have just a handful of 
respondents in each state legislative district and municipality. As a result, scholars have 
been severely limited in their ability to evaluate state or city-level institutional factors 
that might mediate the link between citizens’ preferences and political outcomes. 
Scholars have adopted various techniques to cope with the sparse availability of 
data on citizens’ policy preferences at lower levels of aggregation. Some scholars have 
disaggregated survey data to the district level (Miller and Stokes 1963; Clinton 2006). 
Other scholars have used district-level presidential vote as a proxy for district public 
opinion (e.g. Canes-Wrone, Cogan, and Brady 2002). Still others have employed 
demographics (Peltzman 1984) or simulation techniques (Ardoin and Garand 2003). All 
of these methods, however, have clear drawbacks. In particular, they are ill-suited to 
estimate the policy preferences of geographic sub-constituencies or the preferences of 
non-standard geographic units such as cities.  
In this paper, we provide a new method to estimate the policy preferences of 
small geographic units. First, we use an original survey that allows us to jointly scale the 
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policy preferences of respondents to seven recent, large-scale national surveys using an 
item-response theory (IRT) model (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Shor and 
McCarty 2011). Our original survey serves as a mechanism to pool the other datasets, 
allowing a much larger dataset than was previously possible. This approach enables us to 
develop a continuous measure of the policy preferences of 275,000 citizens in all fifty 
states.  
Next, we use this large national sample to estimate the average policy preferences 
of citizens in every state, congressional district, state legislative district, and large city in 
the country. We generate estimates of mean policy preferences using both simple 
disaggregation and multi-level regression with post-stratification (MRP). In general, we 
find that both approaches yield accurate estimates, even in small geographic units. 
Despite our very large sample size, however, we find that MRP almost always produces 
more accurate estimates of the mean policy preferences at each geographic level than 
disaggregation (Warshaw and Rodden 2012).  
We also show how our large sample of citizens’ policy preferences can be used to 
estimate the preferences of geographic sub-constituencies, such as partisan sub-
constituencies in each congressional district. Finally, we move beyond estimates of mean 
district preferences to examine other quantiles of the distribution of preferences. For 
instance, it is straightforward to use our approach to estimate the ideological 
heterogeneity of citizens’ policy preferences in each geographic unit. 
These new estimates of citizens’ policy preferences can be used to address a 
variety of substantive questions on representation. In this paper, we demonstrate two 
applications to the study of representation at lower levels of government that are under-
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studied in political science: state politics and urban politics. These literatures are 
important in their own right, but studying lower levels of government is also vital for 
understanding representation more broadly, because it allows us to examine the role of 
institutional moderating factors on representation (Lax and Phillips 2009). 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss our approach to conceptualizing 
policy preferences. Next, we discuss the datasets we use for our analysis. Then we 
describe our methodology for jointly scaling respondents from multiple contexts, and 
using this data to estimate the mean policy preferences of citizens at a variety of 
geographic levels. Next, we validate and describe our estimates. Then, we present 
applications of our measures to examine representation in state legislatures and city 
governments. Finally, we briefly conclude with some suggestions for future research. 
 
HOW HAVE PAST SCHOLARS MEASURED SUB-STATE LEVEL POLICY 
PREFERENCES?  
 
Previous scholars have used a variety of approaches to measure citizens’ policy 
preferences at the state level. The most straightforward approach is to use data from a 
representative survey that asks respondents for their preferences on individual issues 
(Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 1993). But national surveys generally do not have enough 
respondents to develop accurate estimates at the sub-state level (Erikson 1978).  
Other scholars have used election returns to estimate district preferences (e.g., 
Canes-Wrone, Cogan and Brady 2002; Erikson and Wright 1980). The advantage of this 
approach is that it is explicitly based on electoral behavior, it is available across all states 
and districts, and it is updated frequently (Kernell 2009). However, presidential vote 
shares in any given election may be largely the product of short-term forces (Levendusky, 
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Pope, and Jackman 2008). In addition, even if short-term forces could be removed, the 
medians of district preferences can only be ranked ordinally based on presidential vote 
share if researchers are willing to assume equal variance across districts (Kernell 2009). 
Finally, it is impossible to measure the preferences of district sub-constituencies (e.g., the 
preferences of Democrats or Latinos) using presidential vote shares.  
The most recent development is the use of Bayesian approaches to measure 
district-level policy preferences (e.g., Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2008). Several 
scholars have used multi-level regression and post-stratification (MRP) to estimate state 
and district-level public opinion on individual issues using survey data (Park, Gelman, 
and Bafumi 2004; Lax and Phillips 2009). This approach builds on earlier simulation 
approaches (e.g., Ardoin and Garand 2003). It employs Bayesian statistics and multi-
level modeling to incorporate information about respondents’ demographics and 
geography to estimate the preferences of each geographic sub-unit even if survey samples 
are small. Warshaw and Rodden (2012) show that MRP produces more accurate 
estimates of district-level public opinion on individual issues than either disaggregation 
of national surveys or presidential vote shares.  
In this paper, we use item response theory estimation and a dataset of surveys 
linked by our “super survey” to estimate of citizens’ policy preferences at a variety of 
geographic levels. We further improve our estimates by applying MRP to incorporate 
information about respondents’ demographics and geography into our model 
 
IDEAL POINTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 
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We assume that both citizens and legislators have a unique set of policies that 
they “prefer” to all others.2  This point in the policy space is called an “ideal point.” 
Scholars studying the United States Congress have long recognized the utility of thinking 
about legislators’ preferences in terms of ideal points derived from a spatial model of 
choice (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 2000; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004). An ideal 
point is a convenient summary of how far to the “left” or the “right” a person’s policy 
preferences are on each policy dimension. We assume that on any given dimension, 
people prefer policies that are closer to their ideal point over policies that are farther 
away. Ideal points are latent traits because we cannot observe them; we can only estimate 
them based on the observed policy choices of each person. 
Ideal points are only defined relative to the particular choices that are used to 
estimate the policy space (Bafumi and Herron 2010). For example, ideal point estimates 
for members of the Senate are not generally comparable with ideal point estimates for 
members of the U.S. House since each chamber votes on a different set of roll calls. This 
limitation prevents us from directly comparing ideal points between groups responding to 
disjoint sets of choices. In order to pool data over multiple surveys, we need ideal point 
estimates for respondents to each survey that reside in a common policy space. We 
address this problem by using common questions asked to different sets of people to 
bridge the ideal points of survey respondents into a common space. In the future, we 
could jointly-scale the spatial positions of legislators and other institutions into this 
common scale (Bafumi and Herron 2010; Shor and McCarty 2011). 
 
DATA 
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Ideal point estimation typically draws on responses to individual-level, binary 
choices. We use seven recent large-scale surveys of the American public (the 2006, 2007, 
2008, 2010, and 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys (CCES) and the 2000 
and 2004 Annenberg National Election Surveys (NAES)). Each of these surveys asked 
between 14 and 32 policy questions to 30,000-80,000 Americans.3 Combined, these 
surveys include more than 275,000 respondents (Table 1). We gain additional 
information about respondents’ policy preferences using modules we placed on the 2010 
and 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys. Most of the survey questions used 
here are binary, but when they are not, we dichotomize them by separating responses into 
two ordered categories.  
The key to our research design is bridging respondents in a way that allows us to 
generate common space ideal point estimates (see Bailey 2007 and Bafumi and Herron 
2010).4 As mentioned earlier, we cannot directly compare ideal points if they are 
estimated using disjoint sets of people answering disjoint sets of choices. However, we 
can estimate comparable ideal points if there is a sufficient overlapping set of choices 
and/or people to bridge individuals into a common policy space. 
We link together survey respondents using the module we placed on the 2010 
Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. In this module, we asked 1,300 survey 
respondents a large number of questions with wording identical to questions asked on 
previous CCES and NAES surveys. These common questions allow us to place 
respondents from all seven large-sample surveys on a common scale. Our module is a 
superset of all of the questions on the other surveys, hence the name “super survey.”  We 
  7 
also asked a large set of additional policy questions, which enables us to estimate more 
precise ideal points than was possible with the smaller sets of questions on earlier surveys. 
 
STATISTICAL MODEL FOR CITIZENS’ POLICY PREFERENCES 
 We combine observed survey responses from all of our surveys. This yields a set 
of millions of unique choices. The number of rows of our so-called “roll call matrix” 
corresponds to the number of respondents, and the number of columns corresponds to the 
number of survey questions. 
 We assume that all survey respondents have a quadratic utility function with 
normal errors (Clinton, Jackman Rivers 2004; Treier and Hillygus 2009). Each item j 
presents individuals i with a choice between a “Yes” position and a “No” position. Let yi,j 
=1 if individual i votes yes on the jth roll call and yi,j =0 otherwise. We assume a 1-
dimensional policy space, where xi ∈ R is the ideal point of respondent i. We choose a 
one-dimensional model because a two-dimensional model shows little improvement in 
terms of model fit.5 
 We estimate the ideal points using a Bayesian Item-Response (IRT) model 
(Clinton, Jackman Rivers 2004; Jessee 2009). Let i = 1, . . . , n index individuals and j = 
1, . . . , m index items. Then our model is 
(1)  Pr(yij =1) =Φ(uij −α j ) , where  
(2)  uij = xiβ j ,  
yi,j  is the i-th respondent’s answer to question j, xi  is the ideal point for respondent i, β j is 
the “discrimination” parameter for item j, α j  is the “difficulty” parameter for item j, and 
Φ(•)  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
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There are three parameters in Equations (1) and (2). The ideal point xi  for 
individual i signifies the “liberalness” or “conservativeness” of that individual. We orient 
our xi  values so that lower values are associated with politically left preferences and 
higher values with politically right preferences. Ideal point estimates lack an absolute 
alignment. We resolve this problem by normalizing them. The discrimination parameter 
β j  reveals how well an item discriminates between liberals and conservatives. The 
difficulty parameter on issue j, α j , is related to how liberal or conservative a person must 
be in order to be indifferent toward agreeing or disagreeing with the item. 
We assume that a question asked on our CCES module is no different than a 
question asked on the source surveys. At first this may not seem like an assumption at all. 
After all, the questions are exactly the same. However, the context of the questions may 
be different (e.g., the status quo may have changed on particular items). In order to be 
conservative we only “bridge” questions that have similar margins across surveys and 
time. Although the composition of districts changes over time, we see little difference 
over the period in which these surveys are pooled. However, our estimates should be 
interpreted as an average of the positions of the geographic areas in question between 
2000 and 2011. 
 We approximate the joint posterior density of the model parameters using a 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004). We 
use diffuse normal priors for the discrimination parameters, β j , and the ability parameters, 
α j , with mean 0 and variance 25. We specify normal priors with mean 0 and variance 25 
for each xi . To make the estimation manageable, we use software that does parallel 
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draws of the Gibbs sampler using graphics processing units (Lewis, Lo, and Tausanovitch 
2011). This reduces our computing time by a factor of 15-20. 
 
MEASURING THE POLICY PREFERENCES OF STATES, CONGRESSIONAL 
DISTRICTS, STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS, AND CITIES 
 
 In this section, we describe how we estimate the mean policy preferences of 
citizens in each constituency, the preferences of sub-constituencies such as Democrats 
and Republicans, and the average heterogeneity of each  constituency. 
Estimating the Mean Preferences of Each Geographic Constituency 
 
The most straightforward way to use our large sample of citizens’ policy 
preferences to estimate citizens’ preferences at a variety of geographic levels is to 
estimate the simple “disaggregated” mean of each state, city, and legislative district 
(Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 1993). Our large sample size lends itself well to applying 
disaggregation since we have an average of over 5,000 respondents in each state, 500 
respondents in each congressional district, and 100 respondents in each city with more 
than 25,000 people.6  
 An alternative strategy introduced by Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2004) and Lax 
and Phillips (2009b) is to estimate district-level public opinion using multilevel 
regression and poststratification (MRP). Pairing this technique with our very large dataset 
of citizens’ policy preferences may yield even greater accuracy. MRP models incorporate 
information about respondents’ demographics and geography in order to estimate the 
public opinion of each geographic subunit (see Gelman and Hill 2007 and Jackman 2009 
for more about multilevel modeling). Specifically, each individual’s survey responses are 
modeled as a function of demographic and geographic predictors, partially pooling 
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respondents across districts to an extent determined by the data. Thus, all individuals in 
the survey yield information about demographic and geographic patterns, which can be 
applied to all district estimates. Several recent studies have found that MRP models yield 
accurate estimates of public opinion in states and congressional districts using national 
samples of just a few thousand respondents (Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2004; Lax and 
Phillips 2009b; Warshaw and Rodden 2012). 
 To estimate the policy preferences of citizens in each state, congressional district, 
state legislative district, and city, we use an MRP model similar to the one in Warshaw 
and Rodden (2012). In the first stage of the model, we estimate each individual’s policy 
preferences as a function of his or her demographics and geographic location. We assume 
that the “geographic effects” in the model are a function of a vector of demographic 
factors that previous studies have found to influence constituency preferences. For 
instance, the congressional district effects are modeled as a function of the state into 
which the district falls, the district’s average income, the percent of the district’s residents 
that live in urban areas, the percentage of the district’s residents that are military veterans, 
and the percentage of couples in each district that are in same-sex couples.7  The state 
effects are modeled as a function of the region into which the state falls, the percentage of 
the state’s residents that are union members, and the state’s percentage of evangelical or 
Mormon residents. The second stage is post-stratification. In this stage, we use the multi-
level regression to make a prediction of public opinion in each demographic-geographic 
sub-type. The estimates for each respondent demographic geographic type are then 
weighted by the percentages of each type in the actual district populations.8 Finally, these 
predictions are summed to produce an estimate of public opinion in each district.     
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Estimating the Policy Preferences of Geographic Sub-Constituencies 
 Many questions of representation concern the relative weight that elected officials 
attach to the preferences of various sub-constituencies (Fenno 1978). Our large sample 
enables us to go beyond estimates of the average preferences in each state or district to 
estimate the preferences of various types of sub-constituencies in each district. These 
estimates could enable scholars to better address a variety of substantive questions on 
representation. For instance, scholars could use our estimates of the preferences of 
partisan sub-constituencies to examine whether legislators are differentially responsive to 
citizens in their own party (Clinton 2006). In Online Appendix A, we use simple 
disaggregation and MRP to generate estimates of the mean Democrat and Republican in 
each state. We validate our measures against partisan sub-constituencies’ voting behavior 
and self-identified ideology in recent exit polls. 
Estimating Quantiles Beyond the Mean 
 Our large dataset of American’ policy preferences also provides sufficient sample 
size and granularity to move beyond estimates of median district preferences to examine 
other quantiles of the distribution of preferences. For instance, a frequent hypothesis 
about the distribution of district preferences is that greater heterogeneity in district 
preferences should weaken the link between the median voter and representatives (Bailey 
and Brady 1998, Ensley 2010; Gerber and Lewis 2004). The literature on polarization 
and electoral constituencies also emphasizes the role that ideological extremists play in 
candidate reelection. This suggests that there are other quantiles and summary statistics 
that will be of theoretical interest to future work in representation, and that our method 
will allow empirical investigation of these quantities. In Online Appendix B, we use our 
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large sample to estimate the heterogeneity of citizens in each state and congressional 
district and we validate these estimates by comparing them to other recent estimates of 
heterogeneity in the electorate.  
  
VALIDATION AND DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
 How well do our measures of citizens’ policy preferences perform? Figure 1 
compares the correlations of mean disaggregated policy preferences and MRP policy 
preferences with 2008 presidential vote shares at the level of states, congressional 
districts, state senate districts, state house districts, and cities. As we noted above, 
presidential vote shares are not a perfect measure of citizens’ policy preferences. But a 
high correlation with presidential vote shares would suggest our estimates are accurate 
measures of citizens’ policy preferences. Moreover, it is useful to compare the 
correlations of disaggregated and MRP estimates of policy preferences with presidential 
vote shares to evaluate which one performs better. 
Figure 1 about here 
 Figure 1 compares three different measures of citizens’ policy preferences at a 
variety of geographic levels:  
• Disaggregated estimates of citizens’ policy preferences generated using the 2006 
CCES, with a sample of approximately 36,000 Americans. 
• Disaggregated estimates of citizens’ policy preferences generated using our large 
sample of the policy preferences of 275,000 Americans. 
• MRP estimates of citizens’ policy preferences generated using our sample of the 
policy preferences of 275,000 Americans. 
 
 Most importantly, Figure 1 demonstrates the value of our large sample of 
Americans’ policy preferences compared to smaller datasets. Both the disaggregated and 
MRP measures estimated using our super-sample dramatically outperform estimates 
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generated using the 2006 CCES. The differences are particularly large at lower levels of 
aggregation. For instance, disaggregated estimates of the preferences of state senate 
districts from the 2006 CCES are only correlated with presidential vote share at about .46, 
compared with .77 for disaggregated estimates from our pooled dataset.  
 For larger geographic units, the MRP and disaggregated estimates of citizens’ 
policy preferences are roughly equivalent. At the state-level, the MRP and disaggregated 
estimates of citizens’ policy preferences are both highly correlated with presidential vote 
share. At the congressional district-level, the MRP estimates are correlated with 
presidential vote shares at .92, compared with .90 for our disaggregated estimates.  
 The MRP estimates substantially outperform disaggregation, however, at lower 
levels of aggregation.9 Despite our very large sample size, the disaggregated estimates of 
the policy preferences of state senate district are correlated with 2008 presidential vote 
shares at just 0.77, compared with 0.88 for the MRP estimates. For state house districts, 
the gap is even larger. The disaggregated estimates are correlated with 2008 presidential 
vote shares at 0.64, compared with 0.85 for the MRP estimates. Finally, disaggregated 
estimates of the preferences of cities with more than 25,000 people are correlated with 
presidential vote shares at about 0.66, compared with 0.76 for the MRP estimates. 
 Even though our disaggregated estimates are based on a very large sample of 
275,000 Americans, our MRP estimates outperform disaggregation in all geographic 
units smaller than states. These results suggest that MRP estimates of citizens’ mean 
policy preferences should almost always be preferred to simpler disaggregated estimates 
(Warshaw and Rodden 2012). In the remainder of this paper, we use our MRP estimates 
for all analyses. 
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Figure 2 about here 
 Figure 2 shows the policy preferences of voters by state. It shows that our 
estimates of policy preferences vary sensibly across geographic units. Idaho, Oklahoma, 
and Utah are the most conservative states; Washington DC, New York, Vermont, and 
Massachusetts are the most liberal states. The figure also shows that precision of each 
method is proportional to the size of the state. In large states such as California, both 
MRP and disaggregation yield very similar estimates. In smaller states, the MRP 
estimates are partially pooled toward the national distribution. Nonetheless, the MRP 
estimates are slightly more precise than the disaggregated estimates.  Finally, the figure 
shows that our estimates are precise enough that the preferences of different states can 
generally be distinguished from one another.  
Figure 3 about here 
 Figures 3 illustrates our estimates for cities. It shows the policy preferences of 
citizens in 34 cities in Texas with more than 50,000 people. Once again, the estimates 
vary sensibly across cities. Our estimates suggest that Austin is the most liberal city in 
Texas, while Amarillo is the most conservative city. These estimates are highly correlated 
with the 2008 presidential vote share: in Austin, President Obama received 71% of the 
vote, while he received just 26% of the vote in Amarillo.   
 On our website, we provide our full results for the mean disaggregated and MRP 
ideology in every state, congressional district, state legislative district, and large city, as 
well the standard errors of each estimate. We also provide estimates of the preferences of 
Democratic and Republican sub-constituencies in each state and congressional district 
(Online Appendix A), as well as the ideological heterogeneity of each state and 
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congressional district (Online Appendix B).  
 
APPLICATIONS 
 
 In this section, we demonstrate two applications of our estimates of constituent 
preferences. In each application, we use the super-survey to estimate ideological 
preferences at a different level of geographic aggregation. The variation in the 
applications illustrates the range of substantive questions that our new dataset could help 
scholars answer.  
Representation in State Legislatures 
 In the past, state politics scholars have been hindered by the unavailability of data 
on policy preferences at the level of state legislative districts. As a result, most studies of 
representation have focused on the U.S. Congress. This focus on Congress has hindered 
scholars’ ability to study institutional factors that affect representation (Wright, Osborn, 
Winburn, and Clark 2009). For instance, it remains unclear how factors such as term 
limits and initiatives affect state legislators’ responsiveness to public opinion. 
The relatively few studies that have focused on representation in state legislatures 
have used various proxies for the preferences of state legislative constituents. Some 
studies have used data on demographics to estimate the preferences of district 
constituencies (Hogan 2008).  But the relationship between demographics and ideology is 
generally weak and heterogeneous across states (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). 
Other studies have used the distribution of presidential vote shares as a proxy for state 
legislative districts’ ideological preferences (Shor and McCarty 2011; Wright, Osborn, 
Winburn, and Clark 2009; Shor 2010).  However, this measure is vulnerable to home-
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state effects, regional biases, and heterogeneity in the relationship between policy 
preferences and presidential vote shares across districts. In addition, presidential vote 
data is difficult to collect at the state legislative level.   
Figure 4 about here 
 Our approach enables us to provide a direct estimate of citizens’ policy 
preferences in each state legislative district. Figure 4 illustrates an application of our 
estimates to representation in state legislatures. This figure shows the relationship 
between district ideologies and state house members’ ideal points in Pennsylvania, 
California, Wisconsin, and Texas.10   We find a large and statistically significant 
relationship between district policy preferences and roll call voting in all four states:  
legislators in more liberal districts tend to have more liberal ideal points.  However, even 
conditional on the policy preferences of a district, Democrats tend to have much more 
liberal voting patterns than Republicans. State legislatures appear to resemble Congress, 
where scholars have found significant splits between Democrats and Republicans after 
accounting for the policy preferences of their constituencies. These results also illustrate 
that within-party representation varies across states. In some states, such as Wisconsin 
and Texas, there is little relationship between the preferences of a district and legislators’ 
ideal points within parties. In other states, the ideal points of Democrats and Republican 
appear to be vary significantly within parties due to the preferences of their districts.  
Representation in City Governments 
 One of the most important questions in the study of local politics is whether city 
governments respond to the will of their citizens. For instance, do more liberal cities have 
more progressive tax regimes, or higher per capita spending rates?  There is significant 
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evidence that policy outcomes at the state (Lax and Phillips 2009; Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver 1993) and national levels  (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) are highly 
responsive to citizens’ preferences. At the city-level, however, the lack of data on public 
opinion has stymied research on the link between citizens’ preferences and salient policy 
outcomes. As Trounstine (2010) puts it, “in order to explain how well and under what 
conditions city policy reflects constituent preferences, we need … some knowledge of 
different constituents’ preferences.”  But, “[b]ecause we lack survey data on local public 
opinion, we lack a sense of the underlying distribution of interests at the local level...”   
Scholars have used two approaches to overcome the unavailability of public 
opinion data. As in the state politics and Congress literatures, some scholars have used 
demographic information as a proxy for preferences (Trounstine 2010). But the weak link 
between demographics and public opinion applies as much in the city context as it does 
in other contexts (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). Other scholars have focused on a 
small number of urban areas with large survey samples (e.g., Palus 2010). However, there 
is no reason to believe that the link between public opinion and policy outputs in these 
large cities is similar to other types of cities.  
To address these problems, we estimate the policy preferences of citizens in 1,502 
cities with more than 25,000 people. We find significant variation in the policy 
preferences of cities. Not surprisingly, we find that San Francisco, Berkeley, and 
Cambridge are three of the most liberal cities in the country. Mesa AZ, Provo UT and 
Waco TX are three of the most conservative cities.  
Figure 5 about here 
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 These new estimates enable scholars to re-examine the link between public 
opinion and city policy outcomes. For instance, one important policy decision made by 
city governments is the choice regarding whether to institute progressive or regressive tax 
regimes. Sales taxes are one of the most regressive sources of tax revenues. Thus, one 
way to measure the progressivity of a city’s tax revenues is to examine the percentage of 
its revenue that come from sales taxes (Gerber and Hopkins 2011). In Figure 5, we 
present a simple scatterplot of the relationship between city policy preferences and the 
percentage revenues that come from sales taxes (in the states that allow municipalities to 
collect sales taxes). In general, we find that conservative cities obtain significantly more 
revenues from sales taxes than liberal cities.11 Thus, the linkage between public opinion 
and policy outputs at the city level appears to mirror the link between public opinion and 
policy outputs at the state and federal levels. This analysis could easily be extended to 
other policy areas, and it could incorporate the effect of elections (Gerber and Hopkins 
2011) and other institutional and economic factors (Hajnal and Trounstine 2010). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This article addresses a crucial question in the study of Congress, state politics, 
public opinion, and political geography: How should we measure policy preferences at 
the sub-national level?  Even the largest national surveys lack sufficient statistical power 
to estimate citizens’ preferences at the level of congressional districts, let alone cities, 
state legislative districts, and other small geographic units. As a result, scholars have 
relied on a variety of proxies for public opinion, all of which have serious flaws. In this 
paper, we have developed a new survey-based estimate of the public opinion of 275,000 
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people. This new measure enables scholars to estimate citizens’ policy preferences at a 
variety of levels of geographic aggregation where public opinion estimates were 
previously unavailable.12 
 In this paper, we have described two illustrative applications. First, we show how 
our data will enable scholars to examine the link between public opinion and state 
legislative representation. We estimate the policy preferences of every state legislative 
district in the country, and use these estimates to examine the link between public opinion 
and roll call voting in four state houses. We find a moderate link between public opinion 
and roll call voting patterns in these states, even after controlling for legislators’ 
partisanship. Our estimates of the policy preferences of state senate districts could be 
combined with recent estimates of legislators’ ideal points in all 50 states (McCarty and 
Shor 2010) to examine how institutional factors affects the link between voters 
preferences and legislators’ voting behavior.  
Second, we show how our data will enable scholars to examine the link between 
public opinion and city policy outcomes. In the past, scholars of urban politics have 
estimated public opinion using city demographics or they have limited their analysis to a 
small number of cities with large survey samples. However, our estimates enable scholars 
to examine representation in over 1,500 cities with a population of more than 25,000 
people. We find a strong link between public opinion and city taxation regimes. 
Conservative cities have much more regressive tax regimes than liberal cities. 
Beyond our substantive findings on representation we have shown the vast 
potential our new estimates of constituent preferences provide for testing different 
hypotheses about the mapping of public preferences into legislative action. For instance, 
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our sample can be jointly scaled to include legislators or candidates who responded to the 
National Political Awareness Test survey. We can also extend our analysis to develop 
multidimensional models to examine whether preferences that don’t fit into the most 
prominent political cleavage are important in legislative actions and electoral contexts 
(Bailey and Brady 1999). 
 The study of elections, representation and policy preferences has historically been 
driven by large data sets. Even as great progress has been made, there is a clear need for 
this empirical project to get even bigger, that even in a time when surveys of 50,000 
people and more are available, even more data is needed. We solve this need for more 
data by using a tried and true workaround, which has advanced science and social science 
many times before: the pooling of data. Our innovation is to create a new data set 
“merely” by pooling others. One of the great virtues of this innovation is that it is 
scalable: we now have the ability to pool even more data as it becomes available. 
 Although the advance introduced here is one of data and measurement, it is as 
much substantive as methodological. Better measurement enables us to ask new questions, 
while giving better answers to old ones. We are better equipped to answer the question 
Miller and Stokes asked in 1963: what is the extent of constituency influence in 
Congress? At the same time, we can ask this question about every level of government, 
furthering our ability to understand the factors that improve democratic representation. 
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Table 1: Data Sources for Super-Survey 
Survey Respondents Policy Items 
2010 CCES module 1,300 136 
2011 CCES module 2,500 41 
2006 CCES 30,000 16 
2007 CCES 10,150 14 
2008 CCES 32,800 15 
2010 CCES (Common Content) 55,000 22 
2011 CCES (Common Content) 20,000 14 
2000 NAES 58,400 28 
2004 NAES 81,400 25 
 
 
  26 
 
Figure 1: Validation of Our Policy Preferences Estimates 
 
 
This figure shows the tight relationship between our estimates of citizens’ policy preferences at 
each geographic level and 2008 presidential vote shares. The hollow triangles show the 
correlation with disaggregated estimates of citizens’ policy preferences using the 2006 CCES, the 
hollow dots show the correlation with disaggregated estimates of citizens’ policy preferences 
using our super-survey, and the black dots show the correlation with MRP estimates of citizens’ 
policy preferences using our super-survey.  
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Figure 2 
 
This figure shows the disaggregated and MRP estimates of the policy preferences of the mean 
citizen in each state. The circular dots are MRP estimates and the squares are disaggregated 
estimates. The graph also shows confidence intervals for each estimate. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
This figure shows disaggregated and MRP estimates of the policy preferences of the mean citizen 
in each city in Texas with more than 50,000 people. The circular dots are MRP estimates and the 
squares are disaggregated estimates. The graph also shows confidence intervals for each estimate. 
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Figure 4 
 
This figure shows the relationship between district policy preferences and legislators’ ideal points 
in the Pennsylvania, California, Texas, and Wisconsin state houses.  The lines are loess plots of 
the relationship between district policy preferences and legislators’ ideal points in each party. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
This figure shows the relationship between city policy preferences and the share of city revenues 
collected from sales taxes in states that allow municipalities to collect sales taxes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●● ● ●
●
●
●
●
● ●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●● ●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Relationship between City Policy Preferences and
Sales Tax Revenue
(Among states that allow local sales taxes)
City Policy Preferences
Sh
ar
e 
of
 C
ity
's 
Ta
x R
ev
en
ue
s f
ro
m
 S
ale
s T
ax
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
  31 
                                                                                                                                            
1 We are grateful for feedback on previous drafts of this paper from four anonymous 
reviewers, Adam Bonica, Joshua Clinton, Morris Fiorina, Robert Gulotty, Simon 
Jackman, Howard Rosenthal, Jed Stiglitz, and participants at the Stanford American 
Politics Workshop and 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Conference. We 
are especially indebted to David Brady, Jeff Lewis, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Jonathan 
Rodden for their generous advice and support. Data and supporting materials will be 
made available at www.americanideologyproject.com/data upon publication. 
2 Individuals do not need to be able to identify this policy bundle. It merely must be true 
that they would choose this policy bundle over any other one in a pairwise comparison.  
3 The large number of questions in these surveys reduces the measurement error in our 
estimates of citizens’ policy preferences (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008). 
4 Bailey (2007) compares ideal points of the president, senators, representatives, and 
Supreme Court justices. Bafumi and Herron (2010) compare the ideal points of president, 
senators, representatives, and voters.  
5 Scaling our super survey alone, we find that a one-dimensional model correctly 
classifies 78.8% of all responses. A two dimensional model increases the percent 
correctly predicted to 80.2%, an increase of only 1.4 percentage points. This is less than 
the increase in fit that is used in the Congressional literature as a barometer of whether 
roll call voting in Congress has a one-dimensional structure. 
6 The survey data does not include identifiers for state legislative districts and cities. As a 
result, we use respondents’ zipcodes to match respondents to these geographic units. 
Specifically, we estimate the proportion of people in each zipcode that live in each state 
legislative district or city using GIS software. Then, we probabilistically assign survey 
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respondents to state legislative districts and cities based on the proportion of people in 
their zipcode that live in each geographic area. Overall, this process introduces a small 
amount of noise into our estimates, but it does not introduce any systematic bias. 
7 These data were obtained from Census factfinder.  
8 Previous work using MRP at the state level has used the “Public Use Microdata Sample” 
(PUMS) from the Census (e.g., Lax and Phillips 2009). However, the PUMS data does 
not include information about respondents’ congressional, state-legislative districts, or 
cities. Fortunately, the Census Factfinder includes demographic breakdowns for each city, 
state legislative district, congressional district, and state for the population 25 and over, 
which we use to calculate the necessary population frequencies for our analysis. This 
approach introduces some error into our analysis. But this error is likely minimal since 
only about 10% of the voting population is under 25 and the demographic breakdown of 
the 25 and over population is generally similar to the voting-age population. 
9 To estimate the presidential vote share in state legislative districts and cities, we 
aggregated precinct-level 2008 presidential election data collected by Ansolabehere and 
Rodden (2012) for 39 states.  
10 We estimate state legislators’ ideal points using roll call data from the 2009-2010 and 
2011 session collected by the Sunlight Foundation.  
11 In cities in states that allow municipalities to collect a sales tax, there is a correlation 
of .34 between a city’s policy preferences and the share of its revenues from sales taxes. 
12 We will make all of our new estimates available on our website soon after publication. 
